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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Joshua Sexton-Gwin entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of burglary
preserving his right to challenge the district court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Information and Challenge-Bind Over Pursuant to I.C. 19-815A. Mr. SextonGwin asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the burglary
charge as his alleged conduct did not constitute entry of a vehicle and, thus, his conduct
did not amount to burglary.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a Second Amended Criminal Complaint alleging that Mr. SextonGwin had committed the crime of burglary by, "enter[ing] into a certain vehicle, to-wit: a
cab over farm truck ... with the intent to commit the crime of theft."

(R., ppAO-42.)

During the preliminary hearing, Mike Sharp, a farmhand working for Paul Sliger, testified
that he came upon Mr. Sexton-Gwin tinkering under the cab of a truck located at
Mr. Sliger's shop near the highway. (Tr. Prelim, p.13, L.22 - p.17, L.5.) Mr. Sharp told
Mr. Sexton-Gwin that he should leave and he did so. (Tr. Prelim, p.17, Ls.6-11.) He
called 911 and, after an officer arrived and took photos, Mr. Sharp "had to put the air
filter back on the carburetor and pull the hood, the cab back down into place and latch
it." (Tr. Prelim, p.17, Ls.19-24.)
Mr. Sliger, the owner of the cab-over farm truck, testified that when he last saw
his truck, the cab was down and that, in order to get access to the motor and
transmission of the vehicle, "[y]ou have to undo the latch and then pull two safety
latches before you can lift [the cab] up." (Tr. Prelim, p.6, L.19 - p.10, L.1; see also
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Exhibits A, C.) Mr. Sliger testified that the "latches and locks that you have to pull in
order to tip the cab forward" are "all outside" and that a person would not actually have
to reach inside the cab in order to unlatch the pins and tip the cab forward. (Tr. Prelim,
p.12, L.20 - p.21, L.9.) Officer Jerry Elliot testified that he was dispatched to the scene
and came upon a "farm truck that had been tampered with" describing it as "a cab-over
farm truck, which the cab has to be physically lifted to get to the engine compartment.
The cab-over was lifted and the air filter housing had been taken off exposing the
carburetor." (Tr. Prelim, p.18, L.22 - p.19, L.20.)
After all of the evidence was presented 1 , counsel for Mr. Sexton-Gwin argued
that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to support a burglary charge arguing
that because the State did not present any evidence that Mr. Sexton-Gwin entered the
passenger compartment of the vehicle, no "entry" was accomplished under the burglary
statute.

(Tr. Prelim, p.35, Ls.3-20.)

The magistrate found that the Idaho legislature

intended the burglary statute to apply broadly and that probable cause to bind
Mr. Sexton-Gwin over into the district court existed.

(Tr. Prelim, p.36, Ls.3-19.) The

State then filed an Information again alleging that Mr. Sexton-Gwin had committed the
crime of burglary by, "enter[ing] into a certain vehicle, to-wit: a cab over farm truck ...
with the intent to commit the crime of theft." (R., pp.44-46.)
Counsel for Mr. Sexton-Gwin filed a document entitled Motion to Dismiss
Information and Challenge Bind Over Pursuant to I.C. § 19-815A (hereinafter, Motion to

The State presented the testimony of two additional officers who participated in the
arrest and questioning of Mr. Sexton-Gwin, neither of whom had any helpful knowledge
of the vehicle Mr. Sexton-Gwin allegedly burglarized. (Tr. Prelim, p.25, L.8 - p.33,
L.24.)
1
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Dismiss).2 (R., pp.72-75.) In his Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Sexton-Gwin argued that "the
state failed to allege sufficient facts to establish probable cause at the preliminary
hearing." (R., p.72.) Mr. Sexton-Gwin argued that even if Mr. Sexton-Gwin lifted up the
cab of the vehicle, his conduct did not constitute burglary under Idaho Code § 18-1401,
as his conduct did "not constitute an entry into a vehicle" and, thus, the State failed to
provide sufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing to establish probable cause that
Mr. Sexton-Gwin committed a burglary. (R., pp.73-74.)
During the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, counsel for Mr. Sexton-Gwin
argued, inter alia, that accessing the engine compartment of the vehicle in this case did
not constitute a burglary as it was not designed to shelter people, animals or property;
that the engine compartment, unlike the passenger compartment or the trunk, is "simply
part of the vehicle itself"; and that, alternatively, under the "doctrine of lenity" the court
should construe the statute narrowly and find that the allegations in this case do not
constitute a burglary as described in that statute. (Tr., p.5, L.12 - p.9, L.12; p.11, L.22 p.12, L.19.) The State argued, inter alia, that because the contents of the engine are
property, a person who accesses the engine compartment "enters" that vehicle for the
purposes of the burglary statute. (Tr., p.9, L.15 - p.11, L.20.)
The district court ruled as follows:
Well, I'm prepared to rule on this motion, despite the lack of law in
Idaho, because you're both correct. I haven't found a case that fits this
factual scenario at all. What we're dealing with here is what's called a
cab-over truck. I think it's clear from the pictures that this is a truck that

2 In the body of the Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Sexton-Gwin stated that the motion was
being brought "pursuant to I.C.R. 3, 5.1, 12(b)(3) and 47, and Idaho Code 19-815A."
(R., p.72.) It is clear in the context of the Motion to Dismiss that the motion was
brought, in part, pursuant to I.C.R. 12(b)(2) (objections based on defects in the
complaint, indictment or information), rather than I.C.R. 12(b)(3) (motion to suppress
based upon evidence being illegally obtained).
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has the driver's, the passenger's seat inside the cab. In order to get
access to the engine, you have to lift that whole part of the vehicle up.
The evidence is really undisputed at this point that the defendant
was inside of the, over the engine area fiddling with an air cleaner or some
tools or something. So the point I'm trying to make is that the evidence,
as I read the preliminary hearing transcript, is that he was inside the
engine compartment.
I will acknowledge that the statute could be interpreted either way.
It is very similar in one regard to the [State v. Ortega, 130 Idaho 637
(Ct. App. 1997)] case because there the defendant had opened the
passenger door, as Madam Prosecutor acknowledges or argues. That's
similar to lifting up a cab, not exactly the same but it certainly breaks the
barrier, if you will, of the vehicle.
(Tr. p.12, L.20 - p.13, L.17.)

The court went on to articulate that it believed the

evidence was sufficient to show that Mr. Sexton-Gwin was the person who lifted up the
cab. (Tr. p.13, L.18 - p.14, L.13.) The Court continued,
So I'm not troubled with the fact that there was sufficient evidence
to put him at the scene and opening the cab. The real question is, does
that act of being under the cab constitute an entry within the meaning of
the statute? I'm going to rule that it does. I recognize, Mr. Hatch, in all
candor that there is another interpretation that could be given to the
statute, but I rely on the language in the [State v. Tarrant-Folsom, 140
Idaho 556 (Ct. App. 2004)] case that's been cited that the court is to give a
rather broad interpretation to the provisions of the statute. That doesn't
mean that I can certainly just make things up, but I think the purpose of
the burglary statute is to protect the integrity of the vehicle.
Under the unique circumstances of this case, I find that the acts
alleged are sufficient to constitute an entry into a vehicle and violate the
burglary statute. Based upon that, I will deny the motion to dismiss. Good
luck on appeal.
(Tr. p.14, L.14 - p.15, L.6.)

The district court entered a written Order Denying

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Information and Challenge Bind Over Pursuant to
I.C. 19-815A, "[f]or the reasons stated on the record during the hearing." (R., pp.79-80.)
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Mr. Sexton-Gwin entered into an agreement with the state whereby he pled
guilty, pursuant to Alforcf, to the burglary charge specifically preserving his right to
appeal the district court's denial of "Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Information and
Challenge Bind-Over Pursuant to I.C. 19-815A held at 2:30 pm on June 6, 2011."4
(R., pp.85-96; Tr., p.17, L.6 - p.24, L.17.) The district court sentenced Mr. Sexton-Gwin
to a unified term of five years, with two years fixed, suspended, and placed Mr. SextonGwin on probation for a period of two years.5

(R., pp.100-111; Tr., p.36, Ls.7-13.)

Mr. Sexton-Gwin filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.112-115.)

3 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) ("An individual accused of crime may
voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison
sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts
constituting the crime.")
4 This reflects the date and time that the district court heard oral argument on
Mr. Sexton-Gwin's Motion to Dismiss. (R., p.78.)
5 As part of his plea agreement, Mr. Sexton-Gwin agreed to waive his right to appeal his
sentence provided that the district court did not exceed the State's recommendation of
five years, with two years fixed, suspended, with Mr. Sexton-Gwin being placed on
probation.
(R., p.88; Tr., p.19, Ls.3-20.) Therefore, Mr. Sexton-Gwin does not
challenge the district court's sentencing decision in this appeal.

5

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Sexton-Gwin's Motion to Dismiss because
unlatching and lifting the cab-over truck to access the engine compartment does not
constitute entry of a vehicle; therefore, there was no probable cause to believe
Mr. Sexton-Gwin committed the crime of burglary?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Sexton-Gwin's Motion To Dismiss Because
Unlatching And Lifting The Cab-Over Truck To Access The Engine Compartment Does
Not Constitute Entry Of A Vehicle; Therefore, There Was No Probable Cause To
Believe Mr. Sexton-Gwin Committed The Crime Of Burglary

A.

Introduction
The district court erred in denying Mr. Sexton-Gwin's motion to dismiss. Idaho

Code § 18-1401 bars entry into only those areas of a vehicle normally used for
transporting people or transporting or storing property.

Although there was probable

cause to believe that Mr. Sexton-Gwin was the individual who unlatched and lifted the
cab portion of the cab-over truck to access the engine compartment, he did not commit
the crime of burglary as defined in I.C. § 18-1401. Therefore, the district court erred in
denying his Motion to Dismiss.

B.

Entry Into The Engine Compartment Of A Vehicle With The Intent To Commit
The Crime Of Theft Does Not Meet The Definition Of Burglary Under I.C. § 181401
Idaho Code § 19-815A provides that a defendant held to answer a criminal

charge after a preliminary hearing may challenge that finding by filing a motion to
dismiss in the district court. I.C. § 19-815A. Mr. Sexton-Gwin concedes that there was
probable cause to believe that he was the individual who unlatched and lifted the cab of
the vehicle and challenges only the district court's interpretation of Idaho Code § 181401 in this appeal. While the district court found that the statute "could be interpreted
either way," the court ultimately interpreted the statute incorrectly. The interpretation of
a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review by an appellate court. State v.
Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 865 (2011). The Idaho Supreme Court applies the following
principles of statutory interpretation:
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The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with
the literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read in
isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document.
The statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be given
their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be noted that the Court
must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none
will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language is
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be
given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory
construction.
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866-67 (2011) (citing Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund,

147 Idaho 307,310 (2009).)

1.

Under The Plain Language Of Idaho Code § 18-1401, Accessing The
Engine Compartment Of A Vehicle Is Not Subject To Prosecution For
Burglary

Idaho Code § 18-1401 is entitled "Burglary defined," and reads as follows:
Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop,
warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse, or other building, tent,
vessel, vehicle, trailer, airplane or railroad car, with intent to commit any
theft or any felony, is guilty of burglary.
I.C § 18-1401. This statute can be broken down into three parts: 1) the criminal act, i.e.,
a person "enters"; 2) the possible locations where the criminal act can occur, i.e., the
structures or things that a person can "enter"; and, 3) the criminal intent necessary at
the time of the entry, i.e., the intent to commit theft or any felony.

Id.

The primary

definition of the term "enter" is a verb meaning "to go or come in or into" and contains an
additional definition of "to go into or upon and take possession." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 267 (2007). Black's Law Dictionary defines "entry" as "To
come or go into; esp., to go onto (real property) by right of entry so as to take
possession."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 572 (8 th ed. 2004).
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Therefore, by the literal

language of I.C. § 18-1401, the term "person who enters" denotes a person who comes
or goes into or onto a place.
The terms "house," "room," "apartment," and "tenement" all describe places that
generally serve as shelter for people (as well as storage for their property). The terms
"shop," "warehouse," "store," "mill," "barn," "stable," "outhouse," and "other building," all
describe places that generally serve as storing personal property (including animals) for
personal use or sale, as well as places where people commonly are employed or
patronize. All of these terms refer generally to real property, as they are attachments to
land. 6

In common parlance and under Black's definition, these are structures that

human beings may "enter" for a variety of reasons.

The term "tent" describes a

movable temporary shelter for either human beings and/or their property. The terms
"vessel," "vehicle," "trailer," "airplane," and "railroad car" all describe things that are
generally designed to transport people and/or their property. Unlike the real property
described above, these items are generally considered personal property. 7
While vessels, vehicles, and airplanes may have engines or motors accessible
via an enclosure of some kind, this does not mean that the legislature intended to
include accessing the engine compartment as conduct potentially prohibited by
I.C. § 18-1401.

In order to determine what portions of these items are potentially

subject to the burglary statute, this Court must consider these items in the context of the
entire statute. "In determining legislative intent, [the Idaho Supreme] Court applies the
maxim noscitur a sociis, which means 'a word is known by the company it keeps. '"
Schulz, 151 Idaho at 867 (citing State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 821 (2000).) The

"Real property or real estate consists of: 1. Lands, possessory rights to land, ditch and
water rights, and mining claims, both lode and placer. 2. That which is affixed to land.
3. That which is appurtenant to land." I.C. § 55-101 (emphasis added).
6
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commonality amongst each of the locations subject to the definition of what can be
burglarized as provided by I.C. § 18-1401, whether real or personal property, is that
they all serve the function of providing shelter for people and/or their property. The fact
that, vessels, vehicles, trailers, airplanes, and railroad cars may serve the additional
function of transporting people and/or property, does not mean that the burglary statute
applies to those areas, such as an engine compartment, that accomplish the
transportation.
When reviewing the statute in its entirety and applying the plain meaning of the
term "enter," only those portions of a vehicle that are normally used for the shelter
and/or transportation of people and/or their property, are subject to being burglarized
pursuant to I.C. § 18-1401. As an engine comportment does not meet that definition,
the plain language of Idaho Code § 18-1401 does not criminalize the unlatching and
lifting of the cab portion of a cab-over truck (absent any indication that the defendant
entered the passenger or storage compartment of the truck in order to unlatch and lift
the cab).

2.

Reading Idaho Code § 18-1401 In Conjunction With Other Statutes,
Accessing The Engine Compartment Of A Vehicle Is Not Subject To
Prosecution For Burglary

If this Court deems it necessary to go beyond the plain language of I.C. § 181401 itself to determine what conduct the legislature intended to prohibit, this Court
should find that the legislature did not intend entry into the engine compartment of a
vehicle to be conduct prohibited by I.C. § 18-1401.

7

"Under the doctrine of in pari

"Every kind of property that is not real is personal." I.C. § 55-102.
10

materia 8 , the legislature's use of the term "vehicle" in the burglary statute should be
defined in conjunction with the statutory definition of the term "vehicle" as used in
Chapter 49 - the "Motor Vehicle" section - of Idaho Code.
The legislature has defined the term "vehicle" by the function it serves, not the
means by which it serves that function. Idaho Code § 49-123(2)(a) provide the general
definition of the term "vehicle" as, "Every device in, upon, or by which any person or
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices used
exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks." I.C. § 49-123(2)(a).9 As the legislature has
defined the term "vehicle" as a "device" by which people and property may be
transported, it is reasonable to assume that the legislature intended only those portions
of a vehicle that can accomplish the transportation of people or property to be subject to
I.C. § 18-1401. Thus, the legislature intended to criminalize, in the burglary statute, the
entry into only those portions of a vehicle "by which any person or property is or may be
transported or drawn upon a highway." Compare I.C. § 18-1401 with I.C § 49-123(2)(a).
The Idaho legislature has further signaled that it draws a distinction between
entering into a vehicle's passenger compartment and accessing a vehicle's engine

8 "The rule that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together means that each
legislative act is to be interpreted with other acts relating to the same matter or subject.
Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same subject. Such statutes are
taken together and construed as one system, and the object is to carry into effect the
intention. It is to be inferred that a code of statutes relating to one subject was
governed by one spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent and harmonious in
its several parts and provisions. For the purpose of learning the intention, all statutes
relating to the same subject are to be compared, and so far as still in force brought into
harmony by interpretation." State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 382 (1999) (quoting Grand
Canyon Dories v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho 1, 4 (1993).)
9 In contrast, the legislature has defined "motor vehicle" and "neighborhood electric
vehicle," at least in part, by the means in which they accomplish motion. See I.C §§ 49123(2)(g) ,(i).
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compartment, in a criminal context. Idaho Code § 49-229 is entitled "Injuring vehicle,"
and reads,
Any person who shall individually, or in association with one or more
others, wilfully break, injure, tamper with or remove any part or parts
of any vehicle for the purpose of injuring, defacing or destroying the
vehicle, or temporarily or permanently preventing its useful
operation, or for any purpose against the will or without the consent of
the owner of the vehicle, or who shall in any other manner wilfully or
maliciously interfere with or prevent the running or operation of the vehicle
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
I.C § 49-229 (emphasis added).

In contrast, Idaho Code § 49-230 is entitled

"Tampering with vehicle," and reads,
Any person who shall without the consent of the owner or person in
charge of a vehicle climb into or upon such vehicle with the intent to
commit any crime, malicious mischief, or injury, or who while a
vehicle is at rest and unattended shall attempt to manipulate any of
the levers, starting crank or other starting device, brakes or other
mechanism, or to set the vehicle in motion, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, except that the foregoing provisions shall not apply when
the act is done in an emergency in furtherance of public safety or
convenience or by or under the direction of an officer in the regulation of
traffic or performance of any other official duty.
I.C. § 49-230 (emphasis added). Through their plain language and when read in pari
materia, Idaho Code § 49-229 contemplates injuring or tampering with a vehicle without
the necessity of climbing on or into the passenger compartment, such as through
accessing the engine compartment or puncturing tire, while Idaho Code § 49-230
contemplates injuring the vehicle specifically through "climb[ing] into or upon such
vehicle." Compare I.C. § 49-229 with I.C. § 49-230. Idaho Code § 49-229 criminalizes
conduct perpetrated outside of the passenger compartment, while Idaho Code § 49-230
criminalizes conduct occurring via the passenger compartment.
The district court found that the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in State v.
Tarrant-Fo/som, 140 Idaho 556 (Ct. App. 2004), demonstrates that courts should give a
12

broad interpretation to I.C. § 18-1401. (Tr. p.14, L.14 - p.15, L.1.) The district court's
reliance upon Tarrant-Folsom is misplaced.

In Tarrant-Folsom, the Idaho Court of

Appeals relied upon language used by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Marks, 45
Idaho 92 (1927), and State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho 124 (1968), and its own decision in
State v. Smith, 139 Idaho 295 (Ct. App. 1993), and found that "the relevant case law

denotes a legislative intent to interpret the burglary statute broadly rather than narrowly
so as to protect structures that shelter people, animals and property." Tarrant-Folsom
at 558-559 (emphasis added). The Tarrant-Folsom Court applied this precedent and
found that the 8 x 10 feet and 8 x 40 feet storage containers the defendant was involved
with entering, "were large enough to constitute buildings and performed functions of
buildings, that is, sheltering and protecting property from the elements and from theft by
non-owners," and, thus, sufficient evidence was presented to support the conviction. Id.
at 560
Neither the Tarrant-Folsom decision, nor the precedent upon which it relies, can
be read as a judicial statement of the legislature's general intent as to what can or
cannot be burglarized. The term "other building" contained within I.C. § 18-1401, when
read in conjunction with the terms "house, room, apartment, tenement, shop,
warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, [and] outhouse," can and should be read as a
catchall category describing "structures" designed for "sheltering and protecting property
from the elements and from theft by non-owners." I. C. § 18-1401; see also generally,
Tarrant-Folsom, supra.

However, Tarrant-Folsom and the cases cited therein do not

describe a judicial fiat requiring a broad interpretation of I.C. § 18-1401. Indeed such a
holding would be of dubious legitimacy.
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A reviewing Court merely interprets a statute, beginning with its plain language,
and it is for the legislature, not the judiciary, to determine whether a statute is socially
unwise or should be amended. Verska v. St. Alphosus Regional Medical Center, 151
Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (quoting In re Estate of Miller, 143 Idaho 556, 567 (2006).) For
example, where the legislature itself provides a statement of purpose that is not
specifically enacted into law, the statement of purpose has no legal effect. Id. at 892893."'The asserted purpose for enacting the legislation cannot modify it plain meaning.'"
Id. (quoting Viking Constr., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., 149 Idaho 187, 191-192
(2010).) By logical extension, the judiciary is not free to interpret a statute more broadly
than the words contained therein, no matter how broadly the Court believes the
legislature intended the statute to be interpreted. See generally, Verska, supra. There
is simply no basis for this Court to conclude that the legislature intended an entry into a
vehicle to extend beyond those places where people or property are normally
transported or stored, based upon a belief or assumption that the legislature meant the
statue to be interpreted broadly. The legislature defines what is criminal - it is not for
prosecutors or the Courts to define what should be criminal.

C.

Alternatively, Under The Doctrine Of Lenity, This Court Should Find That
Accessing The Engine Compartment Of A Vehicle Is Not Subject To Prosecution
For Burglary Under I.C. § 18-1401
'''The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor

of defendants.'" State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103 (2008) (quoting State v. Barnes,
124 Idaho 379, 380 (1983) (overruled on other grounds).) In denying Mr. Sexton-Gwin's
Motion to Dismiss, the district court stated, "I will acknowledge that the statute could be
interpreted either way," and further stated, "I recognize, Mr. Hatch, in all candor that
there is another interpretation that could be given to the statute." (Tr. p.13, Ls.11-12,
14

p.14, Ls.19-21.) Mr. Sexton-Gwin asserts that should this Court not find that I.C. § 181401, on its face, bars prosecution under the statute where merely the engine
compartment was accessed, this Court should apply the rule of lenity and construe the
statute strictly against the State. The district court recognized I.C. § 18-1401 could be
interpreted as counsel for Mr. Sexton-Gwin had argued, yet the Court construed the
statute in favor of the State. 10 Applying the rule of lenity, this Court should construe the
statute against the State and find that the district court erred in denying Mr. SextonGwin's Motion to Dismiss.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Sexton-Gwin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and
sentence and remand his case to the district court with instructions that it enter an order
granting his Motion to Dismiss.
DATED this 5th day of June, 2012.
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To the extent that the district court's decision could be considered discretionary, the
district court abused that discretion. "When reviewing the lower court's discretionary
decision, this Court must conduct a three-part inquiry to examine '(1) whether the lower
court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within
the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.'" State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600 (1989) (quoting Assocs. Nw.
Inc., v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605 (Ct. App. 1987)). In construing I.C. § 18-1401
against Mr. Sexton-Gwin, the district court acted inconsistently with the applicable legal
standard, i.e., the rule of lenity. However, Mr. Sexton-Gwin recognizes that, ultimately,
this Court must interpret I.C. § 18-1401 and does so de novo.
10
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